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Introduction 
The concept of separation plays a major role in Plato scholarship since the very beginning of 
this tradition, when Aristotle decided to comment on his master’s work. Aristotle takes separa-
tion as a central feature of Plato’s ontology and  ends most of his time dedicated to Plato in the 
Metaphysics criticizing this single attribute of the Forms. Surprisingly, Plato himself almost never 
uses the term to describe the Forms or the relationship between Forms and particulars, the only 
exception being the opening moments of Socrates’ discussion with Parmenides in the dialogue 
named after the great Eleatic philosopher (Prm.130b2-5; 130c1-d2).
As we could expect, Plato’s failure to refer to “separation” made some scholars believe that 
this was not an important feature of his ontology after all, or even that it was not one of his 
metaphysical claims (see Fine, 1984, 1986; also Dancy, 1991). However, since Aristotle, for many 
different reasons, is in a very privileged position on the issue of how to understand Plato’s Philos-
ophy, I take it for granted that the concept of separation has a central function in Plato’s theory 
of reality. What I do not take for granted is that we should understand Plato’s concept of “separa-
tion” based on Aristotle’s criticism of it. So, in this paper, I will look for ways to understand “sep-
aration” in Plato regardless of what Aristotle says of it, e ecially regardless of the technicalities 
Aristotle brings to the discussion.
At this point, I am sure the reader expects me to start a discussion about Phaedo’s Affin-
ity Argument (Phd. 7bb-84b) in order to e ablish analogies between the separated souls and 1 Pontifícia Universidade Católica 
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In this paper I present an original interpretation of the concept of separation in Plato. First, 
I argue that despite the fact that the ancient Greek word for “separation” almost never 
appears in the metaphysical discussions of Plato’s dialogues, the key role of the concept 
of separation in Plato’s metaphysics can be attested by the importance the platonic tradi-
tion gives to it. Therefore, understanding separation in Plato seems to be a problem we 
must face, but we do not have a clear strategy to solve it. My strategy will be to tackle this 
problem by looking at a specific passage (Phd. 74 b7-c5) in which Plato distinguishes the 
ontological status of Forms and sensible things. Through the analysis of this passage and 
its relations to another metaphysical argument in Plato (Smp.  211a2-5), I hope to show that 
Plato’s careful choice of words and syntactical structure of sentences aims to distinguish two 
ontologically different types of entities: the unrelational, separate Forms, and the relational 
sensible things. 
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Forms, on the one hand, and things and bodies, on the other. 
But that is not what I am going to do. What I am going to do 
is to analyze a single sentence of the Phaedo in which Socra-
tes explicitly talks about the differences between Forms and 
sensible things. My hope is that a correct appreciation of this 
single sentence will help to clarify the concept of separation 
in Plato’s metaphysics. 
Analysis of 74b7-9
The sentence to be considered in this paper (Phd. 
74b7-9) has for a long time been a source of controversy 
both among translators and philosophers. The main rea-
son for that is the fact that its interpretation depends on a 
series of judgments about Greek syntax. In this section, I 
will present the different syntactical readings for the sen-
tence and discuss some of the philosophical consequences 
related to them. 
The context is of great importance since the sentence 
happens to be located in the context of one of the most fa-
mous statements of Socrates’s theory of recollection (Phd. 
72e-78b). In this part of his argument, Socrates makes the 
very straightforward claim that equal sticks or stones are 
inevitably also unequal. Since, on the other hand, the Equal 
itself cannot betray any measure of inequality, the particu-
lar sticks and stones and the Equal itself are not the same. 
Equal sticks and stones can, however, remind the soul of the 
Equal itself, which the soul must have contemplated before 
incarnation. Therefore, the argument seems to go, the hu-
man soul is immortal.
For the sake of my present argumentation the passage is 
e ecially important because it represents one out of a very 
small number of explicit arguments that Plato gives for the 
claim that Forms are distinct from sensible objects. There-
fore, I wish to focus on the step in which Plato states the dif-
ferences between these two kinds of entities: the Equal itself 
and equal sticks and stones. For the time being, let’s assume 
the following translation for the passage:
Consider thus. Don’t equal sticks and stones 
sometimes, being the same, seem equal to 
one but not to another? 
Certainly.
Well, then, have the equals themselves ever 
seemed to you unequal or equality inequality?
Never yet, Socrates.
So, these equals and the Equal itself are not 
the same (Phd.74 b7-c5).
σκόπει δὲ καὶ τῇδε. ἆρ’ οὐ λίθοι μὲν ἴσοι καὶ 
ξύλα ἐνίοτε ταὐτὰ ὄντα τῷ μὲν ἴσα φαίνεται, τῷ 
 δ’ οὔ; 
Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. 
Τί δέ; αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα ἔστιν ὅτε ἄνισά σοι ἐφάνη, 
ἢ ἡ ἰσότης ἀνισότης;
Οὐδεπώποτέ γε, ὦ Σώκρατες. 
Οὐ ταὐτὸν ἄρα ἐστίν, ἦ δ’ ὅς, ταῦτά τε τὰ ἴσα 
καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον (Phd. 74 b7-c5).
The argument rests on the claim that Forms and sensi-
ble objects have distinct features. While sensible equals also 
appear/are unequal, the Form of Equal does not appear/is 
unequal. The difficulties begin when we try to understand in 
what sense the equal sticks and stones can also be unequal, 
and, on the other hand, in what sense the Equal itself cannot 
be unequal. There seem to be several options of reading each 
one with its pros and cons. 
The Greek text for the  ecific lines I want to consider 
is the following:
ἆρ› οὐ λίθοι μὲν ἴσοι καὶ ξύλα ἐνίοτε ταὐτὰ ὄντα 
τῷ μὲν ἴσα φαίνεται, τῷ δ› οὔ (Phd.74b7-9).
In order to understand the correct meaning of this sen-
tence, we must first deal with the fact that the verb φαίνομαι 
has two distinct uses. If it is followed by an infinitive, its 
meaning is “appears to be” or “seems to be” with the possi-
ble addition “but is not”. On the other hand, if it is followed 
by a participle, it means “seems to be” or “is observed to be” 
with the possible addition “and really is”. Since the text does 
not provide either one of the complements, the interpreter 
must decide for himself which sense Plato intended to con-
vey. And, of course, there are philosophical consequences at-
tached to that choice. 
For some interpreters the mere fact that sensible partic-
ulars can generate contrary perceptions is sufficient to differ-
entiate them from the Forms, even if they are not in them-
selves contradictory entities. This line of interpretation reads 
φαίνεται as followed by an elided infinitive and was advocat-
ed, for instance, by Archer-Hind, for whom “the existence of 
a conflict of opinion is sufficient to e ablish the differences 
between the particulars and the Idea: in the case of the latter 
no such conflict does or can exist” (1883, p. 37).2
Others, however, maintain that Socrates would need 
more in order to distinguish Forms from particulars, e e-
cially in view of Socrates’ further claim that equal sticks and 
stones are in themselves somehow deficient when compared 
with the Equal itself. For those interpreters, Socrates would 
need to talk about the actual properties of Forms and things, 
and not about how these things appear to be. But for that 
claim to be made, Plato would need an elided participle af-
ter φαίνεται (see, for example, Hackforth, 1955, p. 75; Bluck, 
1955, p. 76).
Another point of dispute is the correct understanding of 
the pronouns τῷ μὲν ... τῷ δ’ οὔ. These words offer an even 
wider range of possible readings. First of all, there is a family of 
2 See White (1987, p. 211): “Equal sensibles are capable of presenting misleading appearances in a way in which equality and inequality 
are not. Unlike sensibles, Forms are cognitively reliable”. See also Dorter (1980, p. 54-57).
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manuscripts in which these words are replaced by τότε μὲν … 
τότε δ’ οὔ, which would be translated “sometimes sticks and 
stones, while being the same, at one time appear equal, at an-
other time not”.3 On this reading, Socrates’ point is that a pair 
of equal sticks, while remaining the same pair of sticks, is at one 
time equal and at another time unequal, because they have 
changed. Or, if we assume an elided infinitive after φαίνεται, his 
point would rather be that a pair of equal sticks or stones, while 
remaining exactly the same, seems now equal and now unequal 
not because of their changing, but due to a change in the per-
 ective of the observer. And this contrasts with the Form of 
Equality, which never changes nor even seems to be unequal.
Although there is a re ectable manuscript tradition for 
this reading of the Greek text, it must be noted that this re-
placement would make the use of ἐνίοτε in the sentence a 
little awkward: “sometimes... at one time… at another time” 
(ἐνίοτε… τότε… τότε). Besides, stones are certainly not the 
best sensible entities to illustrate changes over time. No doubt 
stones actually change over time, but they certainly are not 
the most natural example to make the point that sensible 
things change while Forms do not.4 
On the other hand, if we choose to adopt the manuscript 
tradition that reads τῷ μὲν ... τῷ δ’ οὔ instead of τότε μὲν … 
τότε δ’ οὔ, things are not really better. For we can attribute 
three very different meanings to the sentence according to 
the gender we assign to the pronouns. 
The pronouns can be masculine and, in this case, the 
sentence would be translated as: “sometimes, sticks and 
stones, while being the same, seem equal to one person but 
not to another person”. A pair of sticks one meter long, for 
instance, seems equal to one observer and unequal to anoth-
er.5 On initial consideration, this interpretation appears to be 
satisfactory, mostly because it offers a natural translation of 
the Greek. However, on conceptual grounds it seems prob-
lematic. Could it not be the case that the judgment of one 
of the two people is just wrong? Besides, why would Socrates 
explain the ontological differences between Forms and sensi-
ble particulars solely on the ground that one is capable of mis-
apprehending sensible objects, but not Forms? Again, many 
critics emphasize that Socrates would rather make a point 
about these things in themselves, and not about the human 
apprehension of them.
Another option is to consider the pronouns as neutral 
and to render the sentence as “sometimes, sticks and stones, 
while being the same, appear equal to one thing but not to 
another thing”.6 In this case, we would not be talking about a 
pair of sticks or stones. Socrates’ point would rather be that a 
given stick one meter long is equal to another one of the same 
size but unequal to a third stick half-meter long. This reading 
has the advantage of resulting in an obviously true statement. 
Since “to be equal” is a relation between two things, to change 
the second member of the relation would eventually lead to 
the case where the two things are not equal. The problem of 
this reading is that it would make no sense of ἐνίοτε again. 
A stick or stone will always be equal to something and un-
equal to another. So, why would Socrates say that this scenar-
io happens only “sometimes” (ἐνίοτε)? 
A third possibility is to read the pronouns again as neu-
tral, but this time conferring to them an adverbial force. In 
this case, we should translate the sentence as: “sometimes, 
sticks and stones, while being the same, seem equal in one re-
 ect but not in another re ect” (see Haynes, 1964, p. 19-21). 
The point would be that a given pair of sticks can be equal 
in size while being unequal in, say, thickness. This adverbial 
reading has the advantage of leaving un ecified the a ect in 
which the sticks and stones are equal or unequal. As a result, 
it implicitly includes all the other possibilities mentioned be-
fore. Its downside, however, is that it is not usual at all to have 
a neutral pronoun a ing as an adverb. As remarked by Bos-
tock (1986, p. 74), one would certainly expect the feminine 
pronoun in an adverbial construction like this. 
Although commentators have a long debate about 
which one of the above mentioned options is the one that bet-
ter conveys Plato’s intentions, I think that we should consider 
the possibility that Plato is actually leaving the text open for 
these different readings. According to this interpretation, Pla-
to would have chosen a deliberately vague form of writing in 
order to state the fact that sensible objects are contradictory 
in many different ways, all of them expressed by the opposi-
tion of relative pronouns.7
This possibility becomes more likely when we compare 
these lines of the Phaedo with a passage of the Symposium 
(211a2-5). In this Symposium’s passage, Diotima tries to ex-
plain to Socrates the differences between Beauty itself and 
other beautiful things:
First, then, it is always, neither coming to 
be nor passing away, neither increasing nor 
3 Several nineteenth century editions of Plato’s Phaedo adopt the text τότε μὲν … τότε δ’ οὔ, including Grosse (1828), and Wyttenbach 
(1825). The reading is also favored by the French editions of Vicaire (1983) and Dixsaut (1991). For a defense of this reading on concep-
tual grounds see Sedley (2007).
4 Of course, the second criticism is valid only if we accept a veridical reading of φαίνεται.
5 This reading is associated with the assumption that the verb φαίνεται is followed by an elided infinitive. See White (1987) and Wagner 
(1885, p. 124): “Equality in as far as it is perceived by the senses is not certain and unchangeable, as men are apt to disagree about it; 
but abstract equality (αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον) always remains one and the same”.
6 This interpretation is naturally related to a veridical reading of φαίνεται, and was proposed by Murphy (1951, p. 111), Bostock (1986, 
p. 75) and Rowe (1993, p. 169). For a similar view, see Nehamas (1975).
7 The possibility that Plato intended to use a syntactically ambiguous construction was first considered by Gallop (1975, p. 122), and 
Roochnick (2002, p. 140).
Separation and its language in Plato
187Filosofi a Unisinos – Unisinos Journal of Philosophy – 18(3): 184-188, sep/dec 2017
diminishing. Next, it is not beautiful in one 
respect and ugly in another respect (τῇ μὲν 
καλόν, τῇ δ’ αἰσχρόν), nor [beautiful] at one 
time and not at another (τοτὲ μέν, τοτὲ δὲ 
οὔ), nor beautiful compared with one thing 
and ugly compared with another (πρὸς μὲν 
τὸ καλόν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ αἰσχρόν), nor beautiful 
in one place and ugly in another, so as to be 
beautiful to some and ugly to others (ἔνθα 
μὲν καλόν, ἔνθα δὲ αἰσχρόν, ὡς τισὶ μὲν ὂν 
καλόν, τισὶ δὲ αἰσχρόν).
πρῶτον μὲν ἀεὶ ὂν καὶ οὔτε γιγνόμενον οὔτε 
ἀπολλύμενον, οὔτε αὐξανόμενον οὔτε φθίνον, 
ἔπειτα οὐ τῇ μὲν καλόν, τῇ δ› αἰσχρόν, οὐδὲ 
τοτὲ μέν, τοτὲ δὲ οὔ, οὐδὲ πρὸς μὲν τὸ καλόν, 
πρὸς δὲ τὸ αἰσχρόν, οὐδ› ἔνθα μὲν καλόν, 
ἔνθα δὲ αἰσχρόν, ὡς τισὶ μὲν ὂν καλόν, τισὶ δὲ 
αἰσχρόν (Smp. 211a2-5).
As we can see, the three possible readings for the ambig-
uous pronouns of the sentence in the Phaedo plus the version 
with the adverb of time τοτὲ, which we dismissed on tex-
tual grounds, are here laid out by Diotima as different ways 
in which a beautiful thing can be ugly. Well, the same goes 
for equal sticks and stones. There are various ways in which 
sensible equals are (and seem to be) also unequal; each one 
of these ways represents a possible reading for the indefinite 
pronouns we find at the line Phd. 74b7. In the Phaedo, Plato’s 
use of the pronouns is intentionally indeterminate (as indeed 
is his use of the verb φαίνομαι) in order to express in just one 
sentence the many different ways in which the sensible ob-
jects can display their indeterminacy.
Separation
Plato’s use of the indefinite pronouns in the oppositional 
construction τῷ μὲν ... τῷ δ’ οὔ represents an ingenious de-
vice to express the various relations that every sensible object 
holds with other things. These relations are constitutive of the 
sensible objects and they determine what properties these ob-
jects actually have. In fact, the sensible objects are involved in 
so many relations that for each property they have there will 
be another relation in which they display the exact contrary 
property. That is why Plato uses the pronouns together with 
the particles μὲν and δὲ in an oppositional construction.
The Forms, on the other hand, do not hold any kind 
of relation to other things, and that is why they are not de-
scribed by relative pronouns in oppositional construction but 
by the intensive pronoun αὐτός. The contrast between the 
expression τῷ μὲν … τῷ δ’ οὔ used to describe the sensible 
things and the expression αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτὸ used to describe 
the Forms represents, therefore, a synta ical device designed 
to express the distinction between a relational kind of object 
and a non-relational, isolated kind of entity. Sensible objects 
have their properties in relation to other things, and that fea-
ture makes them subject to opposite predications and, since 
their relations are always changing, also unstable entities. 
Forms, on the other hand, have their properties by themselves 
in the sense that their lack of relation with other things makes 
them perfect, stable and independent unities, described only 
by their self-predication. 
Now, if we assume Vlastos’ thesis according to which the 
expressions εἶναι χωρίς and εἶναι αὐτὸ καθ’αὑτὸ “are meant 
to enunciate the same metaphysical claim” (1987, p. 190), we 
come to the conclusion that to be χωρίς (separate) means 
nothing more than to be “isolate”, which is actually the ordi-
nary meaning of this word! In contrast to sensible relational 
things that are what they are only because of their relations to 
other things, a Form is separate (χωρίς) in the sense that it is 
what it is itself by itself (αὐτὸ καθ’αὑτὸ). 
Of course, I am not willing to say that Forms are not 
ontologically independent, prior or transcendent entities. In 
fact, these ontological features are intrinsically connected to 
the fact that Forms are un-relational, isolated entities. How-
ever, it seems to me that to understand the expressions εἶναι 
χωρίς and εἶναι αὐτὸ καθ’αὑτὸ as equivalent to these sophis-
ticated metaphysical theses is misleading in the sense that it 
undermines the descriptive value of these expressions and, as 
a consequence, the most fundamental metaphysical claim at-
tached to them.
To make it clear, my point is that we do not need to un-
derstand separation as a technical term formulated to express 
complex philosophical claims such as ontological priority, 
ontological independence or even transcendence. The dis-
tinction between non-relational and relational entities is at 
the core of Plato’s metaphysics, and to say that the Forms are 
separate is equivalent to stating this very distinction. To be 
separate is to be set apart, disconnected from everything else, 
isolated, but nothing more than that. 
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